Divisionalization in Contests by Huck, Steffen et al.
Divisionalization in Contests
Ste¤en Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Wieland Müller¤
January 31, 2000
Abstract
To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and
disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable
to send several agents into the contest.
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1 Introduction
In many contest environments, the total number of players is limited, but players can
choose between sending one or several agents to compete in a contest. For instance,
in car races teams can send one or two cars into the race. In R&D contests, …rms
may have just one research laboratory or may divisionalize their research activities, in-
stalling several independent research units. More importantly, in markets in which price
competition is e¤ectively ruled out and all competition occurs via upfront sunk sales
e¤orts, …rms may decide to have only one sales department, or they may divisionalize
and choose competing sales agencies. Two examples are the market for prescription
drugs in countries in which price competition for drugs is e¤ectively eliminated due
to the indirect payment arrangements of the health care system, and the highly reg-
ulated pre-1994 insurance market in many European countries.1 There seems to be
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little evidence for divisionalization in the market for prescription drugs, whereas, in
the insurance market, some big …rms owned several smaller insurance companies who
contested for customers with each other and with the rest of the market and some
companies even employed a number of sales agencies that cannibalized on each other.
In this paper we address the question whether divisionalization is pro…table. We
disregard aspects such as intra-…rm governance problems and competing divisions as an
internal incentive system or economies of scale and other cost e¤ects and concentrate
on the strategic aspects that relate to the actual contest. There are three contest
aspects. First, divisionalization increases the number of competitors. Typically this will
reduce the rents earned by all contestants. Second, if a …rm sends several competing
agents into the contest, this …rm’s share in the aggregate rent is increased. Third, if
a …rm sends several agents into the contest and pays for their e¤orts, the divisions
partially cannibalize on each other. The …rm may take this into account and may
reduce competition between the divisions.
In a related context, Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996) considered whether …rms can
gain from divisionalization in a Cournot oligopoly. The divisionalizing …rm gains and
overall pro…ts in this industry are reduced. Divisionalization in contests has similar
e¤ects as regards total pro…ts, but whether the divisionalizing …rm gains depends on
the number of competitors and on the characteristics of the contest.
2 Contests
Let N be the set of …rms, with #N = n: Suppose that each of these …rms has one
contestant in a contest that makes an e¤ort to win some prize of size B. Each contestant
i chooses contest e¤ort xi 2 [0;1) which cannot be recovered, whether the contestant
wins or not. Contest e¤orts determine contestants’ probabilities qi of winning the prize,
according to a contest success function
qi(x1; :::; xn) =
(xi)aPn
j=1(xj)a
for a < n=(n ¡ 1). (1)
This function has been suggested by Tullock (1980) and axiomatized by Skaperdas
(1996). The coe¢cient a in (1) measures how much the contest outcome can be in‡u-
enced by contest e¤ort, and is called the discriminatory power of the contest success
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function. For instance, if a ! 0, each contestant has the same chance of winning,
irrespective of contest e¤orts. If, instead, a ! 1, (1) approaches a contest success
function in which the contestant who makes the highest e¤ort wins for sure. We limit
the discriminatory power to a 2 [0; nn¡1) in order to have well-behaved optimization
problems with equilibria in pure strategies and …rst-order conditions characterizing
these equilibria.2
Firms are risk neutral. Suppose there is no incentive problem between …rms and
contestants. They maximize …rms’ payo¤s
¼i = qiB ¡ xi. (2)
Firm i wins the prize B with probability qi and its contestant spends contest e¤ort
equal to xi. The …rst-order condition for a payo¤ maximum and symmetry can be used
to calculate the contest equilibrium e¤orts
x¤(n) = aB(n ¡ 1)
n2
; (3)
with n being the number of contestants. The equilibrium probability of winning is 1=n
for each contestant, yielding the equilibrium payo¤s as
¼¤(n) = B
n
¡ aB(n ¡ 1)
n2
. (4)
3 Fully non-cooperative divisions
Suppose …rm n decides to divisionalize, i.e., to send two divisions to the contest and
provides each division with incentives to maximize payo¤ as in (2). Divisionalization
increases the set of contestants from f1; :::; ng = N to f1; :::; n1; n2g = N d. We denote
f1; :::; (n ¡ 1)g ´ S and fn1; n2g ´ D. The latter is the set of divisions of …rm
n. Divisionalization is pro…table if the equilibrium payo¤ of the two divisions in the
contest with n + 1 participants exceeds the payo¤ of one participant in a contest with
n participants. This is the case if ¼¤(n) < 2¼¤(n + 1), or, using (4), if
(n + 1)(n ¡ 1)n
n3 ¡ n2 + n + 1 > a. (5)
2For the equilibrium (in mixed strategies) for the case with a > n=(n¡ 1) see Baye, Kovenock and
deVries (1994).
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Denote the left hand side of (5) by a0(n) and note that a0(n) 2 (0; nn¡1). Hence,
Proposition 1 For a given total number n of …rms there is a critical discriminatory
power a0(n) 2 (0; nn¡1) such that divisionalization by one …rm is pro…table for this …rm
if and only if a < a0(n).
Intuitively, if the discriminatory power is very small, e.g., close to zero, then total
e¤ort becomes negligible in comparison to the prize. Accordingly, each …rm earns
almost B=n if it does not divisionalize, and almost 2B=(n + 1) if it divisionalizes.
We also note that divisionalization reduces total industry pro…ts, as n¼¤(n) in (4)
is declining in n.
4 Cooperative divisions
If divisionalization occurs within a …rm, the …rm’s divisions’ e¤orts may be coordinated
by a higher level decision making unit that takes into account that the contest e¤ort
in one division also reduces the other division’s probability of winning.
In this case the total e¤ect of divisionalization can be obtained analytically in two
steps. First, suppose the new divisions behave non-cooperatively. This e¤ect has been
determined in section 3. We call this the team size e¤ect because it is based on the
increased number of …rm n’s contestants. Second, divisions’ choices of e¤ort may be
coordinated. We call this the collusion e¤ect. To analyse the collusion e¤ect we start
with a situation in which all contestants in N d behave non-cooperatively and ask if
the two divisions n1 and n2 can increase their joint pro…ts if they choose their e¤orts
cooperatively.
If divisions maximize …rm pro…t (qn1 + qn2)B ¡ xn1 ¡ xn2 , they take into account
@qi
@xj
< 0 for i 6= j, and therefore, coordination makes them reduce their e¤ort compared
to x¤(n + 1). This decrease is anticipated by contestants k 2 S. Let »(¹x) be the
symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium e¤ort choices of divisions ni 2 D, for given
e¤ort choices xj = ¹x for all j 2 S, and similarly, ¹»(x) the symmetric non-cooperative
equilibrium e¤ort choices of all contestants j 2 S for given e¤ort choices xni = x for
ni 2 D. These functions could, in principle, be obtained analytically from solving the
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…rst-order conditions for fully non-cooperative …rms,
axa¡1i
P
j2Ndnfig xaj³P
j2N d xaj
´2 B ¡ 1 = 0, (6)
for x as a function of ¹x, with x the non-cooperative e¤ort level chosen by all contestants
in D for given uniform e¤ort levels ¹x by all contestants j 2 S, and vice versa for ¹x as a
function of x. The intersection of these two curves characterizes the Nash equilibrium
with xi = xj = x¤(n + 1) = aBn=(n + 1)2 for all i; j 2 N d by (3). For i 2 S, (6) can
be rewritten as a¹xa¡1[(n¡2)¹xa+2xa]B = [(n¡1)¹xa+2xa]2. At the equilibrium value
x¤, by di¤erentiating this condition totally and making use of (3), the slope of ¹»(x) can
be obtained as
¹»0(x) = 2a (n ¡ 1)¡n2 ¡ n ¡ 2a + 2na . (7)
Lemma 1 ¹»0(x) < 0 and lima!0¹»0(x) = 0 at x = ¹x = x¤(n + 1).
For a proof of Lemma 1 observe that the numerator of (7) is positive and the
denominator of (7) is negative for a · nn¡1 and converges toward ¡1 for a ! 0. The
intuition for the limit property in Lemma 1 is as follows. By (6), for a ! 0 each
contestant’s marginal bene…t from e¤ort becomes in…nitely small. Hence, a contestant
would not like to spend much, even if other contestants spend huge amounts.
Using the envelope theorem and the fact that @¼i@xk = ¡ 1n for i 6= k at the fully
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the pro…t is higher for each division if they jointly
reduce their contest e¤ort x starting from x = ¹x = x¤(n + 1) if
¡d¼i
dx
=
1
n
(1 + (n ¡ 1)¹»0(x)) > 0. (8)
A joint decrease in their e¤orts increases their pro…ts if the mutual direct e¤ect of
reduced e¤ort among the divisions outweighs the equilibrium reactions by all other
contestants. The inequality in (8) to be ful…lled is a necessary condition for collusion
to be pro…table. It resembles the condition that has been derived in Gaudet and Salant
(1991) who consider merger in Cournot competition. The pro…tability e¤ect of collusion
is ambiguous in general. However, by Lemma 1, we have
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Proposition 2 A joint marginal anticipated reduction in contest e¤ort among divi-
sions is pro…table if (8) holds. (8) holds if the discriminatory power of the contest is
su¢ciently low.
The intuition for the result in Proposition 2 is as follows. Collusion on contest e¤ort
leads to a reduction in e¤ort for the set of colluders. If this reduction in e¤ort does
not trigger an increase in other contestants’ e¤orts, collusion is bene…cial. As has been
shown in Lemma 1, other contestants react by increases in their e¤ort, but this reaction
is very moderate if the discriminatory power of the contest is su¢ciently low.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we consider the pro…tability of divisionalization in contests. We dis-
tinguish between a team size e¤ect and a collusion e¤ect and show that with high
discriminatory power the team size e¤ect of divisionalization reduces pro…ts and the
collusion e¤ect is ambiguous, but both e¤ects increase pro…ts if the discriminatory
power in the contest is low.
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